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Silence of the Laws? Conceptions of
International Relations and International Law
in Hobbes, Kant, and Locke
MICHAEL W. DOYLE AND GEOFFREY S. CARLSON*
This Essay explains how the political theorists
Hobbes, Kant, and Locke interpret the decision to go
to war (us ad bellum) and the manner in which the
war is conducted (just in bello). It also considers the
implications of the three theories for compliance with
international law more generally. It concludes that
although all three can lay claim to certain key fea-
tures of modern international law, it is Locke who
provides the most complete support for both the laws
of war, in particular, and with international law, in
general.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Inter armas silent leges? In international law war is tradition-
ally seen as a unique condition. Insurance policies are overridden,
property becomes liable to seizure and destruction, and civilians have
* Michael W. Doyle is the Harold Brown Professor of International Affairs, Law and
Political Science at Columbia University. Geoffrey S. Carlson is a JD candidate at Colum-
bia Law School. We are grateful for comments from Jose Alvarez and Mary Ellen
O'Connell and other participants at the Notre Dame Conference on "What is War?"
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lost some rights including, for example, habeas corpus and the right
to a civilian trial, as when President Lincoln suspended it during the
Civil War.1 In war, soldiers are given certain immunities, provided
they obey the laws of war.2 With the rise of undeclared wars and
ambiguous declared wars, whether and why this should be the case
has become subject to debate. In this Essay, we would like to ex-
plore what international political theory can add to explaining the
state of war and its implications for the legal character of the decision
to begin a war (jus ad bellum) and the manner in which war is con-
ducted (jus in bello) in light of the theories of Hobbes, Kant, and
Locke. And taking advantage of the themes that attend this discus-
sion, we take the analysis a step further and ask what the implications
of these theories are for compliance with the laws of war and with in-
ternational law more generally.
International political theory presents numerous visions of the
state of war and peace, 3 but we focus on three distinct ones. One,
called Realist, inspired by Hobbes, portrays war as a condition natu-
ral to anarchy. "Out of civil states," Thomas Hobbes famously con-
cluded, "there is always war of every one against every one."4 Lack-
ing a global common sovereign, inter-state relations is thus a constant
"state of war," whether actual or potential. Another, Liberal Repub-
lican, inspired by Kant, explores the pacifiying effects of liberal prin-
ciples and republican institutions on relations among liberal states.
Amongst themselves, liberal republics can establish a reliable sepa-
rate self-enforcing peace. A third, Liberal Legalism, inspired by
Locke, bridges Hobbes and Kant. Unlike Hobbes, Locke portrays
war as an act, a choice creating a specific condition. "Men living to-
gether according to reason," John Locke announced, "without a
common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge between them, is
properly the State of Nature. But force, or a declared design of force
upon the Person of another, where there is no common Superior on
1. See United States v. Averette, 41 C.M.R 363 (1970) for discussion on military tri-
als of civilians in time of war. Many constitutional law scholars now think that Congres-
sional authorization is also needed to legalize a suspension during a time of rebellion or in-
vasion. In current debates, time of war is being controversially expanded to cover the more
ambiguous situations of "peace operations" and, for some, the "war on terror."
2. For good surveys of pre-UN Charter law see Arnold McNair, The Legal Meaning
of War, and the Relation of War to Reprisals, 11 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS Soc'Y 29
(1925), and the for the post-UN Charter period, John A. Cohan, Legal War: When Does it
Exist, and When Does it End?, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 221 (2004).
3. Michael W. Doyle surveys Realist, Liberal, and Socialist theories of war and peace,
intervention and nonintervention, and just and unjust distributions of international income in
WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE (1997). Some of these remarks draw on arguments presented
there.
4. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier 1962) (1651).
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Earth to appeal for relief, is the State of War."5 Nonetheless, unlike
Kant, Locke sees international peace as troubled; without authorita-
tive international institutions (courts, etc.) rivalries can escalate into
war.
While the two Liberals seem the more obvious foundations of
international law, all three can lay claim to key features of the mod-
em law of war and peace, while curiously upsetting modern interna-
tional law conventions. Despite his rejection of the possibility of an
international law of peace, Hobbes accepts the modern view of sov-
ereign equality. Kant's scope for the international rule of law while
deep among liberal republics is also narrow, rejecting the prospect of
a full state of law among nonrepublics and between republics and
nonrepublics. And Locke, notwithstanding the fact that he laid the
foundation for laws of peace and war, introduces more occasions for
the just use of force.
Hobbes, Kant, and Locke share similar modern foundations in
rational individualism, which makes their international law differ-
ences all the more interesting. Curiously, it is Locke that offers the
most complete-indeed modern-understanding of compliance with
international law in general and the laws of war in particular.
Lockean international law is both a genuine condition affecting all
states and yet is not a fully reliable political framework for order for
any of them.
II. COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONCEPTS AND
FRAMEWORK
Louis Henkin articulated the single most famous statement on
compliance with international law: Almost all states comply with
almost all international law almost all of the time. But "almost all"
might mean a compliance rate of less than 75%. So what is the sig-
nificance of compliance? It is important to distinguish, as George
Downs and colleagues have, between deep cooperation and shallow
coordination as illustrated by the difference between accurately play-
ing "hard" versus "easy music."6 States engage in deep cooperation
when they forego immediate material advantages or make costly
changes in preferences in order to achieve the benefit of long run co-
5. JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 321 (Peter Las-
lett ed., Cambridge University Press 1988) (1690).
6. George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News about
Compliance Good News about Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379, 382 (1996) (comparing
playing "Haydn rather than Maher or Stravinsky").
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operation or avoid the costs of sanctions imposed by others. They
engage in shallow coordination when they make minor changes to
pursue current national preferences that are already clear and widely
recognized.
Shallow and deep compliance seem to vary according to is-
sues and scope. Stanley Hoffmann, for example, distinguished be-
tween three kinds of international law: First, the "law of political
framework" identifies international actors and provides the basic
rules of their interaction, such as sovereignty and nonaggression.
Second, the "law of reciprocity" defines the rules of interstate rela-
tions in areas in which states have a mutual and lasting interest in co-
operation, such as trade or investment law. And finally, the "law of
community... [concerns] problems of a technical or scientific nature
for which borders are irrelevant." 7 Hoffmann believed that levels of
contestation (and by implication compliance) would differ across
these three types of law in any given international system. He further
believed international systems-whether "moderate" or "revolution-
ary"-would differ in the overall levels of compliance. In his view,
the law of political framework, which closely relates to the distribu-
tion of power, would be the most highly contested. By contrast, the
law of reciprocity and even more fundamentally the law of commu-
nity would elicit significant compliance because they involved mu-
tual interests. 8
We want to identify two other dimensions of compliance that
arise in the contemporary debate in international law and politics.
The first dimension tracks indiscriminate versus discriminate compli-
ance. This asks whether states comply equally with all states or se-
lectively with states of a particular kind. The interesting exchanges
between Anne-Marie Slaughter and Jos& Alvarez-focusing on
whether and to what extent liberal states differ in their creation of,
enforcement of, and compliance with international law between
themselves and liberal and non-liberal states-is perhaps the most sa-
lient scholarly debate concerning this issue. 9 Second, compliance
7. Stanley Hoffmann, International Systems and International Law, 14 WORLD POL.
205,210-13 (1961).
8. Id. at 233.
9. See Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and
the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907 (1992) (identifying a "zone of law" be-
tween liberal states and a "zone of politics" between liberal and non-liberal states in the con-
text of U.S. court adjudications using states' domestic laws); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Interna-
tional Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EuR. J. INT'L L. 503 (1995) (discussing processes,
peculiar to inter-liberal state interactions, that will influence how international law operates
between them) [hereinafter Slaughter, Liberal States]; Anne-Marie Slaughter, with a Com-
ment from Jos6 E. Alvarez, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 240 (2000) (summarizing their respective positions on this issue); Jos6 E. Alvarez, Do
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could be distinguished according to whether its scope was wide or
narrow. That is, whether it covered many areas or subjects, from the
law of force through trade and other regulation, or just a few. Hoff-
mann's three levels overlap here, but in this dimension the focus is
on the range of law-governed interdependence and on the difficulty
of achieving cooperation.
III. INTERNATIONAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Hobbesian Realism
Thomas Hobbes, the great seventeenth-century Realist phi-
losopher, explained how insecurity and anarchy were inherently
linked.10 Hobbes argued that states, like individuals prior to the for-
mation of states, are basically similar, self-interested actors. They
are driven by the competition for material goods, contests over pres-
tige, and fear of conquest. The first motive leads to war when one
state is considerably stronger and does not expect costly resistance to
its predation; the second and third when power is more-or-less equal
as neither state is likely to defer to the prestige of the other or know
whether its power is sufficient to deter the other from attacking.
Given the likely uncertainties about other states' motivations, rational
states rarely experience security. They may clash even when each
thinks it is seeking security but, absent a Global Leviathan, cannot
know whether the security of other states is compatible with its own.
War then is a constant possibility in the international system.
The implications of Hobbesian Realism for international law
are complex. On the one hand Hobbes famously declared the "cove-
nants without the sword are but words.""l The globe lacks an armed
Global Leviathan and so international law would lack hierarchical
enforcement. But that does not mean that law would have no role.
Hobbes's logic constitutes the legal foundation of both the doctrines
of sovereign equality and the voluntary, positivistic character of
modern, post-Westphalian international law. Making international
agreements would be an equal right of each and every sovereign, and
these agreements would have equal standing as law. But states' self-
Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L.
183 (2001) (elaborating on potential shortcomings on Slaughter's liberal theory) [hereinafter
Alvarez, Critique].
10. This view is identified with the writings of philosophers from fifth-century BCE
Athenian general Thucydides to contemporary conservative thinkers Henry Kissinger and-
at least before she became President Bush's national security adviser-Condoleezza Rice.
11. HOBBES, supra note 5, at 129.
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interests would still animate international law. So the law would not
constrain self-interest, but perhaps refine it by clarifying ambiguity
and thus solving coordination problems in which states have a mutual
interest in compliance. 12 For example, while sovereigns have prom-
ised and have clear incentives not to harm innocent subjects, foreign
"innocents" (noncombatants) in war are not protected unless a spe-
cific covenant requiring protection has been negotiated, and it is
likely for reasons of mutual advantage (the threat of retaliation) that
state parties to the covenant will comply. 13
The jus ad bellum and the jus in bello reflect these Hobbesian
limits. Hobbesians would expect that states would continue to go to
war driven by the Hobbesian trinity of fear, advantage, and glory, un-
restrained by any international law forbidding armed conflict. And
much of the modern international law of war and peace reflected this
logic. States retained the discretion to declare war (jus ad bellum), at
least prior to the Covenant of the League of Nations, which required
the recourse to peaceful settlement procedures before declaring war,
and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which outlawed the aggressive use of
force. Humanitarian law (jus in bello) from the Hague agreements
onwards restricted how war could be fought, protecting noncombat-
ants and outlawing some needlessly cruel forms of warfare. But
throughout most of the twentieth century, as a Hobbesian realist
would predict, these restrictions were enforced primarily by the self-
interested fear of immediate retaliation, or by victors over the van-
quished as at Nuremberg and Tokyo, and in the ICTY and ICTR. 14
Reputation plays a limited role, constraining a self-interested and
publicly declared defection from an alliance, for example, only when
doing so would leave the defector so notorious as to be shunned by
future alliance partners that it is likely to need for survival. 15
For a Hobbesian, the wider reach of international law would
be limited by self-interest, unless coerced, but available to all states.
The range of subjects ripe for legal agreement could in principle be
either wide or narrow, depending on how interdependent the interests
of potentially benefiting states were. Security interests would tend to
constrain that cooperation, along with multipolar balances of power.
12. Hobbesian international law would thus resemble the model of international law's
limits recently advanced by Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner in their influential THE
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) or Robert H. Bork's The Limits of International Law,
18 THE NAT'L INT. 3 (Winter 1989-90).
13. HOBBES, supra note 5, at 324. Relatedly, subjects that rebel are of course liable to
punishment; and so are their children even to the "third and fourth generation." Id.
14. These are the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
15. Id. at 115.
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Their greater uncertainty would limit international cooperation be-
cause differences in benefits, even if both do experience a pareto im-
provement, can be utilized to tilt the security balance. In contrast,
bipolar balances allow for more interdependence, because the area of
common benefit is larger when states are stably aligned against a
common enemy. This produces more intra alliance coordination and
cooperation of interests; but only within the larger alliances and un-
der the shadow of each polar hegemon. 16
States would be most likely to comply with international law
in the Hobbesian world with respect to community issues where the
common interests of states in, for example, aviation safety or the ef-
ficient delivery of the mails would prevail. 17 These issues would be
limited by national egoism and the degree to which material common
interests overlap. Hobbes' conception of international law would
also succeed in advancing reciprocal interests when retaliation was a
clear means of enforcement, as it would be in simple prisoner's di-
lemma games when iterated over an uncertain future, as Robert Ax-
elrod has argued. 18 Thus trade negotiations under the World Trade
Organization (WTO) enforced with the expectation that the retalia-
tion would be authorized for violations bear the clear mark of Hobbe-
sian rationality. 19 So, too, would the negotiation of bilateral invest-
ment treaties, even ones that involved circumscribed delegations of
sovereignty. But Hobbes is least likely to provide firm foundation
for the law of the framework, the rules of sovereign political inde-
pendence and territorial integrity. It is not that retaliation fails to en-
force those rules, as it would among equal states. Rather, the rules
would lack fundamental support or enforcement in protecting weak
16. For this argument with examples from international monetary relations, see FRED
HIRSCH, MICHAEL W. DOYLE & EDWARD MORSE, ALTERNATIVES TO MONETARY DISORDER
(1977).
17. The Universal Postal Convention, amended by Sixth Additional Protocol to the
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, with General Regulations and the Universal
Postal Convention, Sept. 15, 1999 (entered into force Jan. 1, 2001), available at
http://www.upu.int (last visited Apr. 14, 2008) has 191 state members. See also Constitution
of the Universal Postal Convention, July 10, 1964, 16 U.S.T. 7, 611 U.N.T.S. 7. The
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, Montreal,
May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 106-45 (2000) also enjoys wide membership. See U.S. De-
partment of State, U.S. Multilateral Treaties and other Agreements,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/66287.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2008).
18. Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists, 75 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 306 (1981).
19. For example, when a WTO member state wins a case before the WTO Dispute
Resolution Body, the method of enforcement granted to the state is the ability to impose
countermeasures against the products of the breaching state that are "equivalent to the level
of the nullification or impairment." Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
art. 22(4), Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226.
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states from strong ones.
The key message of Hobbesian Realism is that law is weak,
but relevant. Any law that reflects the material, prestige, or security
interests of a state would be complied with. Moreover, even when
those interests dictate defection, states will be reluctant to acquire the
reputation of faithlessness when they rely on cooperation for sur-
vival.20
B. Kantian Liberalism
Immanuel Kant's 1795 essay, "Perpetual Peace," 21 offers a
coherent explanation of two important trends in world politics: The
tendencies of liberal states to be peace-prone among themselves and
war-prone in their relations with nonliberal states. Kant's theory held
that a stable expectation of self-sustaining peace among states would
be achieved once three conditions were met. He calls them the "de-
finitive articles" of the hypothetical peace treaty he wants states to
sign. We can rephrase them as:
1. Representative, republican government, which
includes an elected legislative, separation of powers
and the rule of law. Kant argued that together those
institutional features lead to caution because the gov-
ernment is responsible to its citizens. This does not
guarantee peace, but selects for popular wars.
2. A principled respect for human rights all human
beings can claim. This should produce a commitment
to respect the rights of fellow liberal republics because
they represent free citizens who constrain their state
and thus those states represent individuals' rights who
deserve our respect. It also produces a distrust of non-
republics because if they cannot trust their own citi-
zens to rule, why should we trust them? 22
3. Social and economic interdependence. Trade and
social interaction generally engender a mix of conflict
20. HOBBES, supra note 5, at 115.
21. IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace, in KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS (Hans Reiss
ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge University Press 1970) (1795).
22. The individual subjects of autocracies, of course, do not lose their rights. It's just
that the autocrats cannot legitimately claim to speak for their subjects. Subjects retain basic
human rights, such as the rights of noncombatants in war. The terror bombing of civilians-
as in the bombings of Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki-constitute, in this view,
violations of these rights and of liberal principles and demonstrate weaknesses of liberal
models in these cases.
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and cooperation. A foreign economic policy of free
trade tends to produce material benefits superior to op-
timum tariffs (if other states will retaliate for tariffs, as
they usually do). Liberalism produces additional ma-
terial incentives to bolster cooperation because,
among fellow liberals, economic interdependence
should not be subject to security-motivated restrictions
("Trading with the Enemy" acts) and, consequently,
will be more extensive, varied, and robust.
Kant suggested that each was necessary to secure a zone of
peace among fellow liberals.23 The first principle specifies represen-
tative government responsible to the majority; the second and third
specify the majority's ends and interests. Kantian Liberalism thus
shapes foreign policy in democracies either because public opinion is
liberal and demands it or the political elite has liberal values and im-
plements it.
With regard to the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, repub-
lics in Kant's view abide by the laws of war unless it is extremely
costly. There should be next to no wars with fellow liberals, as the
empirical record confirms. Although relations between liberals and
nonliberals would be Hobbesian, there should be more restraint in the
jus in bello, reflecting Kantian commitment to human rights. Indeed,
ratification of humanitarian law by a "democracy" does enhance
compliance, as compared with ratification by a non-democracy. 24
Kantian international law is discriminate compared to Hobbe-
sian international law. There is special commitment to fellow repub-
lican states to respect human rights and cooperate economically. Be-
cause law will animate and regulate those obligations, creation of25
and compliance with those laws is embedded in the Definitive Arti-
cles. Professor Slaughter also hypothesizes higher levels of interna-
tional law compliance among liberal states, resulting from, inter alia,
the denser networks of interactions between them and subsequent
channeling of disputes into domestic courts-i.e. "vertical enforce-
ment."26 Outside of the liberal peace, Kant shares some of Hobbes'
23. These three points are developed in Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies,
and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205 (1983); Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal
Legacies, and Foreign Affairs Part II, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323 (1983); DOYLE, supra note
4, at 251-300.
24. See James D. Morrow & Hyeran Jo, Compliance with the Laws of War: Dataset
and Coding Rules, 23 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 91 (2006).
25. We note, however, that this Essay does not purport to address the differences be-
tween how liberal and non-liberal states create international law per se, although this is a
major point of contention between Slaughter and Alvarez.
26. See Slaughter, Liberal States, supra note 10, at 532-34. This enhanced creation
and compliance are two of several results stemming from several "attributes" of liberal
[46:648
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skepticism. He also thinks that immediate self-interest will govern
relations, and that states will develop law outside the pacific union as
they would if they were Hobbesians. The many instances of interna-
tional law creation and compliance between liberal and nonliberal
states that Professor Alvarez identifies provide examples of this.
27
But in addition to sharing Hobbesian assumptions about the dangers
of international relations outside the pacific union, Kantians have
deep moral commitments to treating individuals as ends (i.e. respect-
ing human rights) that shape the policies they adopt and the treaties
they make.
Kantian international law is the most legalized regime, but
only within the liberal peace. The framework of international law is
secured by "Perpetual Peace," itself a peace treaty. Its three defini-
tive articles are legally binding obligations-most centrally the obli-
gation to maintain peace respecting the territorial integrity and politi-
cal independence of fellow liberal states. This is the deepest
cooperation envisaged by the three theories, covering not just shared
common interests and reciprocity reinforced by retaliation (as with
Hobbes) but a legal framework ("constitution") that defines members
and their obligations. 28 This is not global government (the Hobbe-
sian route to peace). It is self-enforced international law, enforced by
a mutual restraint and respect among liberal republics that is pro-
duced by the domestic institutions, and the interests and ideas of the
citizenry those institutions reflect. And there is considerable evi-
dence demonstrating that liberal states actually do abide non-
aggression against fellow liberal states.29
But within the pacific union where cooperation on peace is
deep and complete, the range of subjects for legal agreement is nar-
rowed by a continuing commitment to independence. In order to
avoid the pacific union becoming tyrannical, exercising governing
authority without representation over independent polities, Kant lim-
states, which include "peace", "market economies", and "a dense network of transnational
transactions." Id. at 509-14. But see Alvarez, Critique, supra note 10 (calling into question
the consequences of these attributes).
27. See Alvarez, Critique, supra note 10.
28. This deep cooperation forms the basis for the "zone of law" that Burley-now
Slaughter-identifies. See Burley, supra note 10, at 1918-19. ("This core of common val-
ues and institutions ensures that in most cases states can disagree with the specific policy
choices embedded in each other's national laws but nevertheless respect those laws as le-
gitimate means to the same ultimate ends.").
29. For the debate on the empirical tendency of democracies to remain at peace with
each other see DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones
& Steven E. Miller eds., 1996) that includes essays by Michael W. Doyle, Bruce Russett,
and John Owen and critiques by Henry Farber, Joanne Gowa, David Spiro, and others. The
debate is predominantly over the reasons for the tendency, not its existence.
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its its scope to peace and hospitality (e.g. permitting free trade). 30
Kantian republics would comply with community interests and these
interests might well be broader than those envisaged by Leviathans
simply because security-motivated restrictions would be absent.
When it comes to the law of reciprocal cooperation, the liberal re-
gime would be cross-pressured. It respects the law among liberals,
but it also responds to representative politics, electoral coalitions, and
whims. 31 Thus, liberalism promotes the rule of law domestically and
discounts long-run commitments in favor of interests of present coa-
litions.
These interpretations not only affirm the views of both Pro-
fessor Alvarez and Professor Slaughter in their valuable exchange on
the significance of liberal states for international law, but also recog-
nize the common ground between them. With Professor Alvarez, we
agree that international law shapes the relations of both Hobbesian
Leviathans and Kantian republics when it comes to community and
reciprocal interests. Moreover, although it will be relatively easy to
identify which "engine" is driving law between states (based on their
liberal or nonliberal character) predicting differences between the
quality and character of those laws will be difficult because in com-
munity and reciprocal law Hobbesian self-interest can easily overlap
with cross-pressured Kantian commitments. 32 Indeed, sometimes the
former may be more powerful than the latter. With Professor Slaugh-
ter we agree that liberal states are different, given their special com-
mitments and political character. Thus, we should still be able to
identify special avenues of law formation, cooperation, and compli-
ance between liberal states, mostly importantly in framework law
(the liberal peace itself) and becoming increasingly discernable
within the fields of human rights and deep economic cooperation.
Liberal states are different first and most importantly because
the framework law of sovereign independence is genuinely secure
among them. The most significant effect that appears to follow from
this is a particular form of transnational law. As noted above, it is
30. Kant believes that these limits are natural results of nations' desires to retain their
own cultural character, which will be embedded in, inter alia, languages, institutions, and
ideals (see Perpetual Peace). But while Kant's reasoning appears fundamentally sound, he
may have underestimated the ability of people to find sufficient common ground that would
result in a polity like the European Union, which has particularly strong supra-national gov-
ernance law and institutions.
31. As Beth Simmons and Miles Kahler have noted liberal democracy is dual factor.
Beth A. Simmons, The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs, 54 INT'L ORG. 573
(2000); Miles Kahler, Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization, 54 INT'L
ORG. 661 (2000).
32. Thus, the "burden ... to prove that a liberal/non-liberal distinction exists" will be
difficult to satisfy. Alvarez, Critique, supra note 10, at 123.
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not that transnational law does not exist among nonliberal states. But
it appears so far to be only liberal republics that have formed genuine
transnational political spaces. No common market has evolved into
an integrated political and economic union other than the one among
liberal European democracies. The common markets elsewhere have
either collapsed (East Africa) or remained limited to trade prefer-
ences (the Andean and Central American and South East Asian asso-
ciations). Not all liberals form economic unions, because the inter-
dependence is not strong enough. Yet only liberals have succeeded
in forming economic unions.
Second, liberals have a special affinity to compliance with
human rights. In the era of Abu Ghraib, these clearly must be taken
as far less than an iron law. Nonetheless, linkages between commit-
ment and tendency toward compliance in human rights are special to
democracies, according to various studies by Oona Hathaway. Lib-
eral democracies are not only more likely to comply if they ratify but
also less likely to ratify a treaty merely for reputational gain, irre-
spective of whether they plan to comply, because their reputations
are more fixed.33
And, third, no Alien Tort claim 34 cases have been success-
fully filed against another liberal government or government offi-
cial15-although some plaintiffs have tried it against the United
States, Israel, and Germany. 36 These cases could not overcome ob-
stacles such as the political question doctrine, a finding that the al-
leged activity did not breach the law of nations, and sovereign immu-
nity. 37
33. Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J.
1935, 1999 ("[F]ull democracies appear to be more likely to comply with their human rights
treaty obligations than the group of nations as a whole and more likely when they ratify trea-
ties to have better practices than otherwise expected."). Similarly, Hathaway also finds that
democratic countries are less likely to commit torture and more likely to join the Convention
on Torture than nondemocratic countries. Moreover, ironically reflecting a respect for law
and expectation that it will be enforced, democratic countries that do engage in torture are
less likely to join the convention, unlike nondemocratic countries that are more likely to join
the convention the more they torture. Oona Hathaway, The Promise and Limits of the Inter-
national Law of Torture, in TORTURE: PHILOSOPHICAL, POLITICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
(Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
34. The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) provides that "[t]he District Courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
35. See generally Russell G. Donaldson, Construction and Application of the Alien
Tort Statute, 116 A.L.R. FED. 387 (1993) (citing ATCA cases).
36. See Hirsh v. State of Israel, 962 F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (dismissing plain-
tiffs claim against Germany and Israel that the ATCA provided a basis for recovery of repa-
rations they alleged were due to them under treaty).
37. The closest anyone seemed to come to a successful claim was Jama v. United
States INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353 (D.N.J. 1998) where alien asylum-seekers sued the Immigra-
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C. Lockean Liberalism
Like Kantian Liberalism, Lockean Liberalism focuses less on
capabilities and more on intentions as embodied in institutions and
legal/moral commitments. Locke explicitly analogizes the interna-
tional system's condition to that of equal, rational, and independent
men in the state of nature. 38 And like the Hobbesian Realist's and
Kantian Liberal's natural state, it is anarchic. Locke differs in his
emphasis on the natural rights of life, liberty, and property that all
men are bound to respect even in the state of nature, creating a degree
of mutual trust. These duties elevate the state of nature out of Hob-
besian war and into a peace-albeit a troubled one fraught with "In-
conveniences." These Inconveniences are:
a. That bias and ignorance can cause war among well-
meaning liberals, Locke warns us, is the first "Incon-
venience" of the state of nature. Even though the laws
of nature are clear, we will fail to reflect on their im-
plications or be biased in their consideration in our
own case.
b. That partiality, passion, and revenge can corrupt the
adjudication of even clear law in one's own interest, is
the second. Negligence will make them remiss in the
consideration of the others. Both will lack, therefore,
adequate authority to make adjudication effective.
c. That weakness and fear will erode effective execu-
tion of the law is the third, Locke concludes. The
power to enforce just judgments will thereby be ab-
sent.
Men in Locke's state of nature create states to overcome in-
convenience and protect their natural rights. But unlike Hobbes'
conception of the state of nature, people are not so terrified that they
will submit to just any government; they must consent to civil society
for it to be legitimate. They chose a form of government-
democratic, oligarchical, or monarchic-and allocate functions
among a supreme "legislature" and subordinate "executive" (admin-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS), NS officials, and INS contractors alleging they were
detained under awful conditions and tortured. While dismissing the ATCA claims against
the INS on sovereign immunity grounds, the court refused to dismiss the ATCA claims
against the individual INS officials and allowed the case to reach summary judgment. But
the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), came down
before the case concluded, and the court then dismissed the ATCA claims against the INS
officials saying the claims could not satisfy the Sosa standard for a breach of the law of na-
tions. Jama v. United States INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338 (2004).
38. LOCKE, supra note 6, at 14, 95.
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istrative) and a "federative" (foreign relations) powers. Individuals
agree to obey the laws and cede the right to punish to the state, as
long as the state protects the fundamental rights of individuals and
abides by its constitution. And although the specific form of the state
makes little difference to its legitimacy, Locke prefers and praises
representative government. Any illegal exercise of force, whether
within the state of nature or within a tyranny, creates a right to reen-
ter a state of war, a right to re-bellare.
The same natural rights and duties apply between Lockean
states as between men. And it is these duties that lead just common-
wealths to want to maintain peace with each other. Their public
principles and their institutionalization of fundamental rights enable
them to establish and signal reputations that encourage cooperation.
Adhering to international law is a strategy for doing exactly that, and
thus layers a positivist duty to abide by international law on top of
states' natural duties. But, unlike the Kantian republican peace, the
signaling is unreliable. Natural partiality and the poorly institutional-
ized character of world politics can overcome their duties to try to re-
solve disputes peacefully, resulting in imprudent aggression and
complaisance.
Thus, Locke's international condition is an anarchic state of
nature, a troubled peace fraught with Inconveniences that could dete-
riorate into war through the combined effects of bias, partiality, and
the absence of a regular and objective system of adjudication and en-
forcement. 39 That Locke-unlike Kant-is prepared to delegate for-
eign policy ("federative") power to the executive alone might mag-
nify such inconveniences by removing checks.40 But war must still
be a clear act of aggression violating rights to life, liberty, or property
or a stated declaration of intent to do so. All else is peace. And in
peace, natural law-now, international law-should rule. In short,
the foreign relations of liberal commonwealths differ from Realists'
only in that they remain constrained by the duty not to violate natural
or international law. Rather than Rational Egoists, they are Legal
Leviathans.
Lockean jus ad bellum and jus in bello reflect those distinc-
39. Richard Cox in LOCKE ON WAR AND PEACE (1960) argues that Locke's state of na-
ture would resemble Hobbes's, but we advance reasons below to suggest that we take
Locke's own label, "inconveniences", as just that.
40. But Locke's statespersons, like his citizens, are still governed by the duties of natu-
ral law-life, liberty, and property. Lockean executives and their states are thus distin-
guished by a commitment to mutual trust under the law. In the literature explaining the logic
of negotiation, trust is crucial for stable agreements, and all rational egoistic bargainers will
want to cultivate a reputation for it. See generally Philip B. Heymann, The Problem of Co-
ordination: Bargaining and Rules, 86 HARV. L. REV. 797 (1973); JOHN DUNN, LOCKE
(1984).
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tive features of Lockean international law. Going to war is neither
discretionary (Hobbes) nor precluded (inside Kant's liberal peace).
Instead, for a Lockean, just war is limited to self-defense, as in Arti-
cles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter against attacks on a state's life,
liberty, or property. 41 One exception, however, to the non-use of
forces (except in self-defense) involves cross-border enforcement of
basic rights. In the original state of nature we all have the right to en-
force our natural rights to life, liberty, and property against transgres-
sors. So, too, in international law, Lockean states have rights derived
from our own: political independence from our life and liberty, and
territorial integrity from our property.
Aggressor states that violate natural rights make themselves
targets of just wars (jus ad bellum) of defense and even conquest.
Just conquerors have the right to punish transgressors (for murder,
slavery, and theft) to deter future aggression and to exact just repara-
tions. Transcending the traditional legal standards of sovereign im-
munity, Locke advocated what are now the modem standards of in-
dividual accountability-the post-Nuremberg principles of
international criminal law. Indeed, Lockean standards are if anything
more demanding. They apply to the crimes of war (jus in bello) and
conquest, but also to infringements on property rights. The first two
are punishable by death,42 latter by some lesser penalty. And the
penalties apply to all those who have "assisted, concurred, or con-
sented" in the act of war, which widens the "circle of responsibility"
from conspirators to anyone who merely concurred. That means
Nazi voters could be punished if the Nazi Party plan were known in
1933. 43
That said, Locke's restrictions on just punishment are even
more important for the modem conception of the right of self-
determination and the jus in bello rights of noncombatants. Con-
quest, even just conquest, gives no title to territory. Territory is
worth more than any due compensation and the people retain their
right to self-government and self-determination.44 Moreover, no one
who did not plan, assist, or concur can be harmed. He thus bars all
collective punishment and explicitly excludes reprisals against
women and children. Although property may be seized to exact repa-
rations, property belonging to wives may not be. The rights of lega-
41. See Alexander Moseley, John Locke's Morality of War, 4 J. MIL. ETHICS 119
(2005).
42. LOCKE, supra note 6, at 178.
43. For a contemporary discussion, see MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS ch.
18(2000).
44. As Locke noted, the Greeks retained a right of rebellion against the Turks despite
the centuries of imperial occupation. LOCKE, supra note 6, 441, para. 192.
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tees to subsistence thereby limits what reparations may be justly
seized from a war criminal.45
So while Locke provided a powerful foundation for the pre-
cepts of contemporary international humanitarian law, ambiguities in
his principles illustrate a contemporary dilemma in it. Violation of
natural law inflicted on anyone, anywhere in the original condition
can be punished by anyone. We cede the right of punishment to the
state. Can one state then punish the violations of natural law inflicted
by another state on the second state's own population? Is there a
right of forcible "humanitarian intervention"?
Lockean "federative power" and "tacit consent" further com-
plicate this question. Although violations should be punished, only
the members of a Commonwealth have a right to rebel against their
state. Short of rebellion we must presume tacit consent and tacit con-
sent delegates the federative power to the state which would then
have the right to call upon its citizens to defend itself from the for-
eign humanitarian intervention. Of course, the citizens who think
their state has violated natural law have a right to refuse the call, and
a foreign power could justly support them. But citizens holding dif-
ferent views would have a right and a duty to defend the state against
the same foreign intervention. 46 The "appeal to heaven" (i.e. war)
would be made. Prudent sovereigns, we hope, would refrain from in-
tervention until it was evident by a "long (and large) train of abuses"
or mobilization of popular resistance that a just revolution was un-
derway. And thus we see again why the international condition is
full of Inconveniences.
Lockeanism's implications for compliance in the context of
international law are substantial. As it is for Hobbes, international
law is universally applicable; but, as with Kant, it is embedded in the
rights to life, liberty, and property. Rather than just immediate inter-
est and retaliation, Lockean states have commitments and reputations
that they want to maintain for human rights, property rights, and the
rule of law. These reputations allow law to be more influential, en-
couraging cooperation even when immediate costs accrue.
47
45. Id. at436-38, paras. 181-83.
46. In Kosovo, for example, the Albanian Kosovars welcomed NATO's intervention;
the Serbian Kosovars opposed.
47. See Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 1823 (2002). A commitment to the rule of law also makes compliance more likely
in the expected reciprocity governing monetary commitments. Compliance with Article VIII
of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, which spells out general obligations of members and
prohibits restrictions of the making of payments and transfers for current international trans-
actions, is enhanced by making a formal legal commitment when that commitment is made
by states that measure high on their domestic rule of law (as would a Lockean state). Beth
A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in Inter-
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Lockean liberalism thus tends to deepen cooperation beyond imme-
diate self-interest and fear of retaliation to provide foundations for a
wider scope of legal commitments. At the same time, Lockean
commitments to protecting human rights and punishing violations
could make the international system's foundations in sovereign
equality more contested, rather than more stable, as Lockeans seek to
enforce rights globally. And even though Lockeans engage indis-
criminately with all states that are prepared to make legal commit-
ments, their better foreign relations will be with similar rule-of-law
states.
Judith Kelley recently took advantage of the advent of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC) to explore the reasons behind
states' compliance to treaties.48 Following the ICC's creation, the
United States sought to secure bilateral agreements with other nations
pledging that they would not surrender U.S. personnel to the court,
which essentially meant that the other country would refuse to honor
its ICC treaty obligations vis-a-vis the United States.49 Using quanti-
tative analysis, Kelley discovered a number of interesting patterns
among nations in this context. First, states with a "high rule of
law" 5° were not especially likely to sign onto the ICC relative to
"low rule of law" states. Yet if they had ratified the ICC treaty, the
former were significantly more likely to decline to sign the bilateral
agreements with the United States than the latter. 51 Second, low rule
of law states were actually more likely to sign the bilateral treaties
with the U.S. if they had ratified the ICC than if they had not. 52 And
third, Kelley concludes that the states that refused to sign the U.S. bi-
lateral agreements did so for one or two reasons: respect for the ICC
itself and respect for their treaty compliance in general.53 In sum, a
general respect for the rule of law impelled many states to rebuff U.S.
requests.
national Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 819 (2000).
48. Judith Kelley, Who Keeps Commitments and Why? The International Criminal
Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 573 (2007).
49. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 89(1), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 ("States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and
the procedure under their national law, comply with requests for arrest and surrender.").
50. Kelley uses two measurements to determine the "rule of law" in a state. First, she
uses the International Country Risk Guide (PRS Group 2004) which measures "the peaceful
implementation and use of adjudication through law and established institutions." Kelley,
supra note 49, at 578. Second, she uses the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Research
Indicators Dataset for 2002 which measures the "quality of contract enforcement, the police,
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence." Id. at 579 (quoting DANIEL
KAUFMANN, AART KRAAY & MASSIMO MASTRUZZI, GOVERNANCE MATTERS IV:
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS FOR 1996-2004, World Bank, Draft, at 4 (2005)).
51. Kelley, supra note 49, at 574.
52. Id. at 582.
53. Id. at 586.
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In a similar vein, Beth Simmons has analyzed commitment
and compliance with international monetary law, specifically the ob-
ligations under Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement. 54
With respect to international commitments, Simmons argues that
"governments are much more likely.., to commit... [when] such a
commitment would be credible, but that commitment is also condi-
tioned on other countries' willingness to commit. 55 And because
the IMF agreement lacks any enforcement body, Simmons asserts
that "the desire to avoid reputational costs is crucial" to explain com-
pliance.56 That is, nations want to "send a costly signal to market ac-
tors" that they will maintain certain economic conditions, even when
this "involve[s] domestic political costs." 57 Compliance is especially
enhanced when reinforced by high universal compliance, and espe-
cially influenced by high regional compliance patterns. 8 But Sim-
mons sharply distinguishes two explanatory variables: "democ-
racy"59 and the "rule of law." While she finds that states with a high
rating in the latter have correlatively high rates of compliance,
Surprisingly for those who view the international be-
havior of democracies as somehow distinctive with re-
spect to law and obligation, the more democratic the
Article VIII country, the more likely it may have
been ... to place restrictions on current account. On
the other hand, regimes that were based on clear prin-
ciples of the rule of law were far more likely to com-
ply with their commitments. This finding indicates
that rules and popular pressures can and apparently
sometimes do pull in opposite directions when it
comes to international law. There is no reason to
think, based on these findings, that democracy itself is
a positive influence on the rule of law in international
relations.60
Kantian republics should qualify on both fronts, being com-
54. Specifically, Simmons analyzes nations' commitments to and compliance with ob-
ligations under Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement. See Simmons, supra note 48;
Beth A. Simmons, The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs, 54 INT'L ORG. 573
(2000).
55. Simmons, supra note 55, at 574.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 583.
58. Id. at 589.
59. Simmons functionalizes "democracy" by using numerical scores derived from
POLITY III set data, which measures the existence of democratic institutions in each coun-
try, ranking "competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of
executive recruitment, and the level of constraints on the chief executive." Simmons, supra
note 48, at 833.
60. Simmons, supra note 55, at 595-96.
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mitted to both representative government and the rule of law, but not
all democracies would clearly qualify.
IV. CONCLUSION
These comparisons are purely speculations, illustrated but not
proven. Their significance lies only in the logical coherence between
the literature on the laws of war and peace, the general compliance
with international law, and the causal arguments of the international
political theorists. Realist-inspired states in the balance of power,
liberal states committed to life, liberty, and property, or liberal repub-
lics establishing a separate peace make real-world compromises and
particularize the commitments and institutions that manage those
commitments. But to the extent that the debates on law rest on the
logics the theories develop, these observations are likely to have sig-
nificance as frameworks for explaining compliance with international
law.
Of Hobbes, Kant, and Locke, it is Locke who provides the
firmest theoretical foundations for an international law open to all
states that are willing to abide by it. Hobbes makes it clear that there
are no states outside the zone of law, if we are prepared to include
self-interested behavior as sufficient for lawful compliance. Locke
adds a commitment to law for its own sake, by any state prepared to
make the commitment. He includes both democratic and non-
democratic states within the zone of law-to the extent they are pre-
pared to respect life, liberty, and property. Locke overlooks the se-
cure foundations of the Kantian republican peace, but in doing so,
devises an international rule of law resting on sovereign equality.
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